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Abstract. This paper summarizes a study conducted for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency of the
technical and economic feasibility of using a light gas gun to launch small satellites. The launcher concept is based
upon a distributed-injection gun, which, in principle, can produce high muzzle velocities at relatively low
acceleration levels. To establish initial system requirements for the launcher and spacecraft, the deployment of a
large constellation of telecommunications satellites is chosen as a reference mission. This choice reflects the
dominance of telecommunications in current commercial LEO market projections, but the results obtained for this
mission are later generalized to encompass other applications. The spacecraft mass budget is most affected by large
mass fraction allocations for structure and power subsystems. High acceleration loads are responsible for the
increase in structural mass, and the increase in battery mass is tied to volume limitations that restrict the battery
technology that can be used. The results of the fmancial analysis suggest that achieving a competitive specific
launch cost requires a launch rate beyond current market projections. But a low-volume launch business could
provide an attractive total mission cost relative to current systems.

Introduction
While rockets will certainly be used for
transporting astronauts and very large payloads into
space for years to come, their complexity and high
cost inhibit access to space for many other purposes.
The emerging requirement for maintaining large
constellations of small satellites in low earth orbit
(LEO) is just one of a number of reasons to consider
cheaper launch methods. Several R&D programs are
already underway to develop· more economical
rockets, but orders-of-magnitude reductions in cost
will be difficult to achieve.
About a year ago, the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) asked us to
assess the economic and technical feasibility of
launching payloads in the 10-1000 kilogram range
using a gun. In principle, a gun is an attractive
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alternative to a rocket because it is simple, reusable,
and can provide an order-of-magnitude increase in
payload fraction.
But its disadvantages are
substantial, too. The launch vehicle must survive
high g-loads, as well as the severe heating associated
with transatmospheric flight at hypersonic speed.
And if the gun is large, the orbits that can be reached
may be limited to a single inclination. If these
disadvantages Can be mitigated, however, a gun
launcher would
be
compatible
with
the
"smaller/cheaper" trend in spacecraft design and
would offer major improvements in operability.
A number of types of launcher have been
proposed for gun launch to space, but they· can
generally be grouped into two categories, compressed
gas and electromagnetic. The frrst serious efforts in
this area were made in the early 1960's using
conventional powder guns under the HARP project. l
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The limitation on sound speed due to the high
molecular weight of powder combustion products
required launch vehicles incorporating multi-stage
rockets, significantly restricting payload capacity.
The project was terminated before payloads were
successfully orbited, but this early work did
demonstrate that payloads and rockets could survive
the rigors of gun launch.

package is accelerated by injecting working fluid at
multiple points along the launch tube rather than
having it expand over the entire length from a highpressure reservoir located at the breech. The concept
has been explored previously, both theoreticalll' 6
and experimentally7, although the experiments were
conducted at a scale much smaller than we are
considering here. In its application to space launch,
the distributed-injection technique is used to reduce
the stresses on the launch vehicle (by flattening the
acceleration profile) and to facilitate momentum
management, rather than to achieve previously
unattainable muzzle velocities. In fact, reaching orbit
requires a muzzle velocity in the range of 40%-50%
of the theoretical maximum, which is in keeping with
the documented performance of light-gas-guns.

It was recognized early that launch velocity
would have to be increased by a factor of three in
order to build a system that was "more gun than
rocket." A variety of electromagnetic launchers have
been considered to this end, but despite substantial
investment, progress in the hypervelocity regime has
been disappointing since the pioneering work of the
late 1970's.2 In particular, electromagnetic launchers
are relatively complex, and the lifetime of materials
and components has proven problematic.

Objectives and Approach
Affordability was the dominant factor in the
study. We were asked to consider practical
limitations on the size of the launcher, to defme
recurring and non-recurring costs and achievable
launch rates, and to compare the economics of gun
launch to that of existing launch systems. We were
also asked to identify launch-survivable spacecraft in
the 10-1000 kg range that might be the basis for a
viable commercial application. The general purpose
was to help the government make informed decisions
about the development of an operational launch
capability based on light-gas-gun technology.

In contrast, light gas launchers have shown
steady progress since they were first introduced
shortly after the Second World War, and by the late
1960's muzzle velocity had exceeded escape
velocity.3 Like electromagnetic launchers, light gas
launchers too suffer from barrel erosion and other
problems, but do not become unattractive until much
higher velocities are sought.
Today, muzzle
velocities in the 6-8 km S·I range are routinely
achieved in testing applications.
In the early 90's, the Strategic Defense
Initiative Office (SOlO) considered a two-stage lightgas-gun launcher as a means for deploying the
Brilliant Pebbles spacecraft. The requirement was to
place up to four thousand 100 kg spacecraft into
specified orbits at a rate of one launch every 30
minutes. Researchers at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory (LLNL) analyzed a three-tube,
large-scale version of the SHARP light-gas-gun,
which had been developed earlier by the last author
(Hunter). They judged the system to be technically
feasible. 4
.

The approach we adopted is illustrated in
Figure 1. The initial sizing of the system was based
on preliminary construction cost estimates, rough
estimates of potential market size, and judgements
about technical risk. Because the relative ablation
recession length increases rapidly as the size of the
launch vehicle goes down, we decided that a system
capable of launching spacecraft weighing only lO's
of kilograms was too risky. On the other hand, with
construction costs estimated to be over$2B, a system
capable of launching spacecraft in the 1000 kg
category was considered too expensive. Hence, we
focussed the study on guns designed to launch
spacecraft in the 100-kg range. We started with the
NL-200 (200-pound payload) launcher, which had
been designed to limit peak launch loads to 2500 g's.

Using the experience gained in the SHARP
project, one of the authors (Cartland) joined with
Hunter in developing detailed conceptual designs for
a proposed family of commercial gun launchers,
known as the NL (Jules Verne Launcher) series.
These designs are based upon the distributedinjection launcher concept, and provide an important
source of information for the present study.
The distributed-injection concept is a
variation on the light-gas-gun theme! The launch
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Table 1: System Specifications
Appllf:fftJon.
t..IomI;hS..lja,b
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Figure 1. Overall Approach

In view of the requirement to assess
commercial viability, the defmition of a "Reference
Mission" was guided by market projections. 8,9,IO At
first we looked at a wide range of possible
applications, but soon concentrated on three: 1)
scientific research; 2) earth observation; and 3)
telecommunications. These sectors appeared to have
the highest potential for an active space market in the
timeframe covered by the study; i.e., 2005-2030. The
telecommunications sector, of course, is far and away
the largest, accounting for more than 90% of the
launches projected in the near-term and expected to
grow into a one trillion-dollar annual business by
2001. 8,1l

Orbit Altitude

700 km

Orbit Inclination

90 degrees

Max Deployment Rate

300 per year

Max Launch Rate

2 per day

Mission Life

5 years

LEO constellation

512 in 32 planes

On Orbit Spares

32

SIC Mass (Wet)
SIC Volume
SIC Density

0.17m3
665 kglm3

Average axial acceleration

1,640 g's

Peak axial acceleration

2,500 g's

Average lateral acceleration

15 g's

113 kg

Vibration loads

1700 g's @25 - 250 Hz

Launch Thermal

<50°C

Recalling Figure 1, the general approach
called for the system requirements, the launch system
conceptual design, and the spacecraft system
conceptual design to be established through iteration.
In practice, we had to be content with a single pass.
In the following two sections, we will describe the
launcher and spacecraft systems and note the major
technical risks associated with them.
These
descriptions will be followed by a discussion of the
fmancial analysis results.
Launch System

We selected a telecommunications mission
similar to the one pursued by "Big LEO"
constellations, such as Iridium, which are aimed at
providing real-time worldwide communications. Our
purpose was not to propose an alternate system, but
rather to use the choice to uncover the issues
associated with launching a complex satellite with a
gun. Our hope was that, once the effects of the launch
environment on spacecraft subsystems were
understood, the results could be generalized to other
applications. As a starting point, we developed the
crude set of system specmcations shown in Table 1,
which assumes that the mission can be carried out
with a constellation having the same total mass as the
Iridium constellation.

Launcher
Simply stated, the requirement here is for a
survivable launch of a 113 kg (250-lb) spacecraft to a
700 kilometer polar orbit.
Vehicle design
considerations, to be discussed below, and
ballistic/orbital mechanics lead to a distributed
injection system capable of launching a 682 kg
(15OO-lb) package at an initial elevation of 22
degrees with a muzzle velocity of 7 km s-l.
Somewhat
arbitrarily,
we
limit
maximum
acceleration to 2500 g's. This is a load that can easily
be sustained by modem electronics with little or no
hardening, and is low enough to make survivable
designs for more g-sensitive components plausibl~.
For purely practical reasons, gas temperature IS
limited to 1500 K and peak pressure to 70 MFa (10
ksi), with a target average launch tube pressure of 35
MFa (5 ksi). With these restrictions, the launcher has
a bore diameter of 63.5 em (25 in).and a length of
1.52 km (5000 ft). Fabrication of the launch tube
will require about 2.7 million kg of high-
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quality gun steel (e.g. A 723) to provide a safety
factor of 3 on yield at peak system pressure. Figure 2
shows an artist's conception of the launcher. 12

r-------------------------------------------,

Figures 3a and 3b show results from a scaled
simulation of the distributed injection gas dynamics,
using a base injector and two side injectors. The
simulation is used to verifY performance, and aids in
sizing system components. Both the launch mass and
tube length (i.e. energy or number of injectors)
have been scaled by 3/16, thereby preserving the 7
km s-1 muzzle velocity. The code employed here,
SIDEHEAT, includes a real gas equation of state,
working fluid wall friction, and heat loss to the
walls, and handles shocks with the Godonuv
13

method. Figure 3a shows details of the projectile
base pressure, which are integrated in Figure 3b to
give velocity. As an academic note, Fig. 3b
illustrates the sequential effects on velocity of
viscosity, charnbrage, and distributed injection,
assuming a fixed total reservoir volume and
pressure. In the simplest case, inviscid flow and no
chambrage, the code reproduces the well known
analytic relation between the pressure and velocity
ratios. 5.6
Figure 2. Distributed injection light gas launcher.
The distributed injection system consists of
a base injector and 15 side injector pairs that are
separated by 150 diameters to mitigate drag. Each
injector comprises a high-pressure hydrogen
reservoir, a heat exchanger, and a high-speed valve.
A pumping system requires 1 hr to charge· the highpressure reservoirs to 70 MPa (10 ksi) with hydrogen
from a 14 MPa (2 ksi) storage reservoir. The bighpressure hydrogen passes through a heat exchanger,
reaching 1500 1(, before entering the launch tube at
an angle of 20 deg by way of a high-speed valve.
Simulations show that performance begins to suffer if
the working fluid is injected more than 10 diameters
behind the projectile, and falls off rapidly after 50
diameters, requiring precision timing and valve
opening times on the order of 1 rns near the muzzle.

70
60

Lo<ation 1m)

Figure 3a. Simulation of launch package base
pressure.

As described here, the launcher will operate
with approximately 10 million SCF of hydrogen.
The hydrogen working fluid could be sacrificed on
every launch, but its cost (- $80K) is a significant
fraction of the total launch cost. Thus the hydrogen
is captured with a series of baffles (a "silencer") and
fast shutters at the muzzle, and returned through a
scrubber system to the low-pressure storage reservoir
for reuse. The pumping system is sized to complete
hydrogen recovery in 2 hrs. Evacuation of the launch
tube takes one hour and is essential since the
otherwise enclosed air has a mass comparable to that
of the launch package.

Launch Vehicle

Figure 4 depicts the major components of
the launch.vehicle. The 113 kg (250-lb) spacecraft is
contained in a 0.17 m 3 (6 ft3) compartment aft. The
low drag configuration aeroshell (length/diameter
-11) provides thermal protection and structural
support, and is jettisoned after atmospheric egress. A
single-stage solid rocket motor flIes prior to apogee
and injects the spacecraft into a circular orbit. An
integral attitude control system orients the projectile
after the aero shell is discarded, corrects for thrust

4
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misalignment during motor firing, and may be used
for orbital trim.

About 14 kilograms are reserved for the
hydrazine-fueled attitude control system. The system
includes 6 thrusters (2 pitch and 4 yaw/roll) with Isp
= 230 s. An additional 82 kg (180 pounds) is
allocated for the carbon composite sabot (not shown)
that supports and protects the launch vehicle while it
is in-bore.

7

6

A typical mission for a 700-kilometer polar
launch might unfold as follows. At t-l hr the step-up
pumps begin to charge the high-pressure reservoirs
with hydrogen from the storage reservoir. As the
countdown proceeds, the temperature is raised to
operational level in the heat exchangers, and launch
is initiated by switching the high-speed valve in the
base injector. The position of the launch package is
sensed in-bore, and the side injector pairs are
sequentially triggered. At t+0.44 s, the launch
vehicle exits the muzzle and sheds its sabot. The

distributed injection
- - base injection
--- base injectio~ no chambIage
•••• base iniectio~ no chambI.ge, inviscid

1

OI+O-----~r----l'OO-----~r---~2'OO----~~I-O---,~

Figure 3b. Simulation of velocity for various
constant pV reservoir configurations

,

'....------------240 I n : - - - - - - - - - - - I.....

22.6,ln.
t

ACS
Thrusters

AerosihelliNose
Figure 4. Schematic of the launch vehicle

aeroshell is jettisoned at t+ 300 s, at which point the
launch vehicle is at an altitude of well over 500 km,
and the attitude control system orients the launch
vehicle in preparation for a motor fIring at t+545 s.
After a 91 second bum, orbit is nominally achieved at
t+636 s. Figure 5 is a simulation of the launch
vehicle's velocity proftle during this mission. 17

The launch vehicle can be described as an
"inverse" re-entry vehicle, and employs sinlilar
methods for thermal protection. The aeroshell is
primarily of carbon composite construction and
weighs 223 kg (490 lb.).
Analytic 14 and
15

computational
analysis of ablation predicts
approximately 7.6 cm (3 in) of nose cone recession,
though incorporation of an aerospike might reduce
both drag and deformation during atmospheric
egress. The power law body (r=AxO.65 ) with 7.5 deg
base flare ensures both low drag (Cd = 0.016) and
passive stability, although the margin of stability was
16
estimated to be very small.

7.5

~

7.11

"\"

- - ballistic
powered

IS

i:l~~/\

As currently envisioned the solid rocket
motor weighs 250 kg (550 pounds). It has a steel
case (e.g. D6AC) and an NlI4CI04/AI propellant
with mass fraction of 0.84. The geometry allows for
an expansion ratio greater than 20, giving an Isp of at
least 270 s. With a 6080 N thrust and a bum time of
91 s, the motor supplies the required I1v = 2.1 km s-l
to orbit the spacecraft.

o

200

,,00

000

860

1000

1200

-

1400

Elapsed Time (5)

Figure 5. Simulation of launch vehicle velocity
profile for a LEO mission.
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Scaling and Performance Considerations

"1···.

Many trade-offs can be made between
launcher design, vehicle design, and the manner in
which the mission is executed.
Practical
considerations and the current state of the requisite
technologies can help to bound the design space.
Given the unconventional nature of the gun launch
concept, prudence suggests a conservative approach.
Consider, as one example, the launch tube. Our
conventional solution is steel construction, even
though the melting point of steel limits the working
fluid temperature to less than 1700 K. The 1500 K
working temperature assumed here further limits
sound speed, and hence muzzle velocity, shifting
more of the velocity burden to the injection motor.
However, in spite of a conservative selection of
material and operating margin, the overall system
performance remains impressive.

C

0.3

o

.

'J:
<.I

~ 0.2

0.1

Launch Mass (kg) -sabot not included

Figure 6. Spacecraft mass fraction scaling.
The launcher is optimized for the mission it
is designed to perform. The question then arises as to
how performance is affected by off optimum
operation given that reorientation of a large launcher
is difficult.
Small inclination changes are
accomplished with the rocket motor and, as is well
known, impose a significant penalty on spacecraft
mass. The same is not necessarily true for launch to
different altitudes. As Figure 7 shows, altitudes
below ballistic apogee can be reached with little
change in the total required fl v by entering a
Hohmann transfer ellipse. Spacecraft mass will
likely still suffer to some extent to accommodate a
more complex two-pulse motor.

Examination of launch vehicle scaling
reveals an important point, and serves to illustrate
some of these trade-offs. Take as fixed a number of
parameters such as muzzle velocity, orbital altitude,
drag coefficient, and average base pressure. Under
these conditions, the in-bore stresses are invariant as
the system is scaled photographically, so structural
mass fraction can remain constant. However, a
higher launch mass means a higher ballistic
coefficient and better penetration of the atmosphere.
A shallower launch angle can then be tolerated, and
is in fact necessary to reach a fixed apogee. The
inherently higher angular momentum of the
shallower trajectory reduces the flv requirement for
the injection motor.

v~= 7 km S·'.~.= 21 deg
13=148.000 kg m' (e, = 0.016)

2.8
2.7

Of larger impact is the thermal protection
scaling. Increasing the launch mass decreases the
relative amount of surface area requiring protection,
but the higher ballistic coefficient and more shallow
launch angle yield a higher velocity and longer path
length in the atmosphere. For the range of interest
here, surface area effects dominate aerothermal
considerations, and relatively less shielding is
required at higher launch mass. 18 The net effect is
that rocket motor and heat shield mass can be traded
for spacecraft mass as the total launch mass
.
F'Igure 6 ill
mcreases.
. ustrates this behavior. 19 Note
that the spacecraft mass fraction exceeds that of
conventional launch vehicles by an order of
magnitude or more. Note also that the slight
improvement in launcher performance with size due
to reduced drag and heat loss to the walls has been
ignored.

'..E"

2.6

>

2.4

'3

2.3

C

<I

,::

'.

on. pulse

'"

2.5

"

2.2
2.1

ballistic apogee 681
'\.
km

" '\.1

~(bL-.~~~n~b=m~eo~i~)----~~

200

600

two pulse
(Hohmann like)

~
800

1000

Altitude (km)

Figure 7. Injection motor flv requirements versus
orbital altitude.
Technical Risks

With respect to the launcher, a number of
technologies require testing and integration. The
critical technology is the injection process and the
engineering of the injector. Valves with throats of
tens of centimeter diameter must open within a few
tens of bore diameters of the projectile's passing in a
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requirements, or could not stay within the launch
system constraints, we pursued other solutions at the
system or subsystem level. If a solution still could
not be found, changes in launch system requirements
were considered.

carefully timed sequence. In short, the valves must
open at "bullet" type velocities both precisely and
repeatedly.
Pre-accelerated valves for hydrogen
capture, such as would be required at the muzzle,
20

have
been
demonstrated,
but
reliability,
maintainability, and synchronization remain issues
for all of the high speed valves. The principles of
operation of the heat exchangers are understood, but
further analysis and some experimentation is
necessary to ensure proper throughput, function, and
robustness.
Finally, simulation of distributed
injection launcher performance is a valuable design
tool, but code predictions must be validated against
actual performance data. All of the above could be
adequately tested with a heavily exercised, scaled
prototype.

Table 2: Subsystem Requirements
Subsystem
Power
Bus Voltage

22-34 V

Average Load

251 Watts

Battery

16.0AH

ADACs
Attitude Knowledge

Several launch vehicle issues bear further
investigation. Thermal loads appear manageable
using standard re-entry vehicle J;J1aterials and
techniques, although the aerothermal environment for
egress is more severe. Of particular concern is
hypersonic stability, especially with respect to how it
is affected by ablation. Analysis, simulation, and
experimentation are essential.
Also, launch
acceleration loads are two orders of magnitude higher
than those encountered in conventional space launch.
This is a large step for the space launch community,
but the loads in question are survivable for many
payload components using standard industry design
practices. 21 More g-sensitive components, such as
large optics and deployable structures, need closer
study.

Roll

+/_ 0.6 0

Pitch

+/- 0,9 0

Yaw

+1_ 1.20

Propulsion
Position Maintenance
In Track
Cross Track

+1-2.0km
+1- 1.7 km

Orbit Adjustment
Fix Apogee Error

+/- 0.057°
+/-14 km

Shift in Orbit

+1_6°

I'ix Inclination Error

1T&C
Availability

Spacecraft System

Crnd Up link Data Rate

I kb/sec

Crnd Down link Data Rate

I kb/sec

Subsystem Analysis
Structures
Quasi-Static Loads

Traditionally, a spacecraft is designed to
meet fixed launch vehicle parameters; but in this
study we had the luxury of optimizing the gun,
launch vehicle, and spacecraft to support a specific
mission, and exploring departures from that mission
as a result of launcher constraints. This circumstance
allowed an iterative loop to exist between the
launcher and spacecraft designs that normally is not
there.

2,500 g's

Table 3 shows the subsystem breakout in
terms of mass, volume and associated mass fraction
that was obtained after one iteration. Assuming that
the power system is sized adequately, we note that
there is almost no mass available for the RF payload,
implying that the reference mission cannot be carried
out with the initial gun design. Given the limitations
of time and funding, we were not able to converge on
a spacecraft design that satisfied the original mission
requirements; but we obtained enough information
during the analysis to uncover some of the major
influences of high g-loads and packaging constraints
on subsystem design.

The starting point was the set of system
requirements associated with the reference mission,
which was shown earlier. From this set we derived
the subsystem requirements shown in Table 2. We
then considered various subsystem configurations
and evaluated them against launch system
constraints; e.g., volume, g-load level, etc. If a
configuration failed to meet the mission
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Table 3: Subsystem Allocation
Subs~tem

Vol. (ft')

Kg

Attitur O:tarnination & Oltltrol

I'rop!jsi<m (va)
POY.er

39%. (The total mass comprised 35.8 kg of primary
structure and an estimated 8.5 kg of secondary
structure.) This mass fraction is considerably higher
than the 8% • 15% fraction that is typical of
spacecraft designed for conventional launchers.

10.6

0.34

18.3
,-,,-

0.72

16%

29.7

2.55

26%

iinrtu'es

Designing a power subsystem to meet both
the demands of a communications payload and the
launcher constraints was a challenge. Since the
communications payload was poorly defmed, we
decided to look at the power subsystem
parametrically to see how much power would be
available from various solar array and battery
configurations. Both Si and GaAs solar arrays were
assessed in two body-fixed and two deployed
configurations. The arrays were not designed to
articulate, although in an operational system that
would probably be a requirement.
The .most
powerful configuration was a GaAs array havmg a
length about equal to that of the launch vehicle and a
lateral dimension defmed by its inner circumference,
which could be stowed internally during
trans atmospheric flight. Such an array would be
capable of producing slightly more than 250 Watts.

39%

.Thtnml

- ..

".~

Oxmmndar.:jl:)jtallmding

.•....3%

Part of Payload
""~"

.CN>llit

1.3

0.10

'TT&C
Hlrne;sing

0.9

0.05

1%

1.7

0.10

2"10

12

1.1

113.0

6.0

1%

100"10

Major G-Load and Packaging Influences

As noted earlier, conceptual designs for each
of the spacecraft subsystems were developed with a
system level requirement to meet a peak load of
2,500g. No structural amplification or attenuation
effects were considered. As expected, due their small
mass and volume, electronic components were
relatively insensitive to g-loads. The subsystems most
affected by the high acceleration loads, and other
launcher limitations, were the structural, power, and
attitude determination and control (ADAC)
subsystems.

We studied four types of batteries: NiHz, Li·
Ion, NaS and NiCd. We rejected NaS batteries
because of their experimental nature and thermal
requirements. Li-Ion technology, whi:e pro~sing,
was also rejected because of the battery s mablh~ to
meet the high number of discharge cycles assocla~ed
with the orbit. We would have preferred NiHz
batteries, given their strong space legacy and high
power density (approximately 1.6 x NiCd), but t?ey
require about twice the packaging volume of NICd
batteries. The volume constraint makes them
incompatible with the initial vehicle design. We a~so
believe they would be sensitive to high acceleration
loads. In contrast, NiCd batteries have good
acceleration immunity. If we choose NiCd batteries,
the total power subsystem, including the solar array
and associated electronics, has a mass of
approximately 30 kg, or about 26% of the total
spacecraft mass.

To handle the higher-than-normal launch
loads, we assumed the spacecraft's primary support
structure to be a simple ribbed cylinder. We
examined four materials: titanium (Ti 6AL-4V),
aluminum (AL 6061-T6 and AL 7075-T6) and a
metal matrix composite (AL SiCp/6061-T6). Their
characteristics are compared in Table 4.
Table 4: Structural Material Trades

Material

Strengthl Thermal
Relative
Density Conductivity Cost
(psi/pel) (Btulhr·ft·oF)

AI·6061.T6

370,000

96

Lowest

AI·7075.T6
Ti-6AL.4V
AI-SiCpl6061.T6

770,000

75

Low

812,000
868,000

4
100

Items such as star cameras, reaction wheels
and spinning earth horizon sensors were shown to
have sensitivities to high acceleration loads, so some
technology investments would be necessary to
develop a survivable ADAC subsystem. We do not
believe the design problems to be insurmountable,
however.

Middle
Highest

AL 7075 T6 was chosen as our primary
structural material because of its relatively high
strength, low cost and good thermal conductivity.
Even with the use of this alloy, the structural mass
fraction for the primary structure turned out to be
8
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Generalized Results

to different battery technologies: NiCd, NiH2 and
"advanced technology," by which we mean either LiIon or NaS batteries.

The small mass fraction available for the RF
payload does not imply that a complex
telecommunications satellite cannot be launched with
a gun, but rather that the initial sizing of the gun was
too restrictive for the chosen reference mission. An
RF payload places high demands on power and
volume. In this section, we use the results of the
subsystem analysis to generalize the results to other
possible payloads. The basic question is: what
payload power-mass combinations are compatible
with a 113 kg spacecraft launched at 2500 g' s? In
addressing this question, we also take into account
the effects of a changed mission by allowing for
higher power density batteries and more advanced
structural materials.

Any point in the area underneath any of
these seven lines is a possible design point within the
class of spacecraft addressed in this study. For
example, if one had a 100 Watt payload that required
20 kg, a 39% mass fraction would be allowable, but
an advanced technology battery would be required.
If 40 kg of payload mass were required then
structural mass fraction would have to drop.
Figure 9 shows the same set of curves for a
spacecraft that does not require a propulsion system,
but still must meet the other subsystem requirements,
such as navigation and pointing. As one can see,
when the propulsion system (18.3 kg) is removed
from the spacecraft a different set of curves are
generated. Points on these curves indicate accessible
payloads, as long as the mission does not require
propulsion. Clearly in this case there is more power
and mass available to the payload without employing
advanced technologies.

Figure 8 shows a series of curves that are
broken into three sets. The frrst set is associated with
a structural mass fraction of 39%. The second set
assumes a composite structure with a mass·fraction of
20%. The bottom curve shows a "realistic" design,
where the packaging density is limited to 450 kg/m3
and (because of their volume efficiency and their
legacy of high acceleration applications) NiCd
batteries are used. The curves in each set correspond
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Major Technical Risks

commercial entity, operating as a business that offers
competitive retums to investors. While the current
analysis does not fully address all of the issues inherent
in the term ''business operation," it provides significant
insight and a solid foundation for future study.

The major technical risks appear at both the
system and subsystem levels and are associated with
both high acceleration loads and the small packaging
volume. Conventional packaging densities, coupled
with the increased mass devoted to support structure,
reduces the payload mass substantially.

To accomplish the assessment, we used a
fmancial tradeoff analysis. Just as the launcher system
can be described by a "physical operating parameter
space" of interrelated parameters and characteristics,
such as maximum pressure, barrel length, and payload,
it can also be described by a "fmancial operating
parameter space" of interrelated parameters, such as
construction cost, operating cost, rate of return, and cost
of launch vehicle. The physical characteristics of the
launcher system link the two parameter spaces together,
so that tradeoffs in one area lead to changes in the
parameters of the other. For example, if the payload
mass increases then either the internal rate of return
increases or the cost per kg decreases. In the following
sections, we describe the parametric analysis we
conducted to explore the feasible "fmancial operating
region" for the launch system, and then compare the
results to conventional systems.

High acceleration loads affect all subsystems,
but components such as the large optics in a star
camera, reaction wheels, or spinning earth horizon
sensors will need special attention. Issues associated
with packaging and deploying solar arrays and antennas
are of paramount importance. Gun-launched spacecraft
will require high packaging densities, but with the
industry looking towards micro- and nano-spacecraft,
high density designs may be possible in the future.
Financial Analysis
Assumptions &: Methodology Overview
The major premise shaping the fmancial
analysis was that the gun launch system would be a

•
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t = unit number
Affordabilily Metrics and Concepts

Yt = cost of unit number t

We used several standard financial metrics as
our FOM (figure of merit) for affordability. This
section provides a quick review of those measures and
concepts discussed in this paper. A more complete
review of Internal Rate of Return and Net Present
Value can be found in Blanchard22 • Stewarr3 contains
an excellent discussion of learning curves.

The exponent b is defined by

b = In(m)
In(2) ,
where m is the learning curve rate expressed as a
decimal. The learning curve rate and initial unit cost of
the launch vehicle were used as parameters in the
analysis.

The Net Present Value (NPV) is a metric that
quantifies the value of an income stream (which can
contain either positive or negative cash flows in each
period) over a period of time, taking the interest rate
into account. In mathematical terms:

Financial Model

•
The financial model provided a year by year
representation of cash inflows and outflows for the
launch complex based on selected physical and
financial parameters. Several key assumptions were
built into the model, and not subject to variation during
the course of the analysis.
In general, these
assumptions were detennined by the ground rules of
considering the launcher as a commercial system that
had to recoup its operating and construction costs. The
model has a fifteen-year planning horizon, with a time
resolution of one year. We assumed that the first three
years were devoted to the construction of the system.
The maximum launch rate during the fourth year was
either 50 per year or the prevailing yearly launch rate,
whichever was less. This assumption allowed for
possible construction delays and a "shakedown" period
for launcher system operation. There was no allowance
for "down time" for major maintenance or
refurbishment.
We assumed that any major
maintenance could be completed without affecting the
yearly launch rate.

n

NPV = L1<;(l+it
1=0

where
NP V = Net Present Value
t = time period in years
n = number of years
net cash flow in year t
The Internal Rate of Return (IRR) is a measure of
profitability. It is the interest rate that, when applied to
a stream of cash flows causes the NPV to be zero. It is
analogous to the return on a mutual fund or certificate
of deposit. Mathematically, IRR is defmed as the
interest rate i* such that:
n

0=

L 1<; (1 +i*)-I
1=0

All other terms are as defmed previously for NPV.
NPV and IRR were both used as parameters and as
FOM's in the analysis.

Construction costs were fully amortized by the
end of the fifteenth year. We assumed that a quantity of
funds was borrowed at the start of the program. The
funds not utilized for construction in. a year were
invested at the prevailing interest rate. All funds
borrowed for construction were expended by the end of
the third year. Using an initial sensitivity analysis on
the fund expenditure profile (the percentage of total
construction funds expended each year of the
construction period) we detennined that the impact of
varying the profile within reasonable limits was
marginal. The analysis was performed with a profile
that assumed 50% expended in the first year, 25% in
the second, and 25% in the third.
The model
automatically calculated the required funds based on
the construction costs, the expenditure profile, and the
interest rate. This calculation established the yearly
construction loan payment. Eight percent was used as

The Learning Curve, or progress function, is a
means of quantifying how familiarity and experience
with the completion of a product lead to greater
efficiency and cost reduction in production. Learning
curves are frequently expressed as percentages. An
85% learning curve implies that a cost reduction of
15% occurs when the number of articles is doubled.
The fourth unit produced would cost 85% of the cost of
the second unit, the eighth unit would cost 85% of the
fourth unit, and so forth. Mathematically, the learning
curve relationship is defmed by the following equation:

I:=tr; b ,
where
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the prevailing interest for all calculations. The actual
cost figures were derived from estimates based on a
mix of Cost Estimating Relationships (CER's) and
analogous component estimates that were prepared for
the construction of the NL-200 launcher in Adak,
Alaska.

the launch vehicle. More detailed estimates were based
on subsystem-level pricing of the conceptual vehicle
shown in Figure 4, and on inflation-adjusted cost
breakdowns for the Brilliant Pebbles4 and HARPl
vehicles. The latter estimating methods produced
similar vehicle costs, ranging between $280,000 and
$320,000 per vehicle. Costs associated with the launch
vehicle assumed great importance in certain launch
parameter scenarios, and so we chose to use the higher
fidelity approach in our work.

Due to the inherent uncertainty in cost
estimates based on such a preliminary design, our
sensitivity analysis (discussed later) was designed to
ensure we were able to bound the construction costs.
The construction costs were broken down to a Level II
Work Breakdown Structure (WBS). Some selected
components included the launch tube, injectors,
hydrogen storage, hydrogen heaters, valves, handling
equipment and site work.

Several cost elements were not modeled due to
the large amount of time that would have been required
to analyze them. These elements included taxes,
insurance, depreciation, range clearance costs, and the
cost of a major refurbishment of the launch complex.
There were no land acquisition costs allocated. We
assumed that any environmental impact approvals were
obtained with reasonable processing costs that were
included in the construction costs. We further assumed
that there were no additional costs or delays to the
project due to litigation, strikes, or other causes.

Operating costs were divided into fixed and
variable costs. Fixed costs represented "housekeeping"
costs that were independent of the number of launches
per year. The flXed costs (payroll, supplies and site
maintenance) were taken to be $4,000,000 per year,
based on the NL-200 launch cost estimates. Variable
launch costs represented a "per launch" cost including
labor, hydrogen, etc., but did not include the cost of the
launch vehicle. These variable launch costs were also
based on the NL-200 launch costs. The data provided
variable costs for 75, 150, 300 and 600 launches per
year. Variable costs were approximately $5,200 per
launch at a launch rate of 300 per year. We performed
a log transformation on the data and then based the
costs on a linear regression model of the transformed
data. This regression was used to estimate the "per
launch" costs in the model for the varying launch rates
under analysis.

Representative values for several key financial
parameters are contained in Table 5.

Table 5: Financial Parameters
Representative Values
Quantity
Interest Rate (per year)
Amortization Period (years)
Spacecraft Weight (kg)
Price per kg

Value
8.0%
15
113
$3,486

Initial Launch Vehicle Cost
~$320,000
Launch Vehicle Learning Curve
90.0%
Launch Vehicle Cost
$109,589
Launcher Construction costs
$298,000,000
Yearly Construction Loan Amortization
$32,928,784
Fixed Launcher Operating Costs
$4,000,000
$15,551,000
Variable Launcher Operating Costs
Average Yearly Launch Vehicle Costs
$32,876,584
Launches per year
300
Yearly Gross Revenue
$118,597,576
Internal Rate of Return
8.0%
Net Present Value
$0

Three cost elements were tied to the launch
vehicle: 1) the initial vehicle R&D costs; 2) the cost of
the first vehicle (Y I); and 3) the learning curve rate for
launch vehicle production. The inclusion of these
elements reflected the assumption that the business
entity operating the launch complex would be
responsible for developing and building the launch
vehicle. The model also provided the option to use a
flXed cost per vehicle, reflecting the possibility that the
vehicles would be purchased from some other
commercial source instead of being developed
internally. These two approaches yielded slightly
different results, due to the effects of the discount rate.
We considered several methods for estimating
the cost of the first launch vehicle. One method made
use of the NASA Advanced Mission Cost Model24,
which provided a ROM (rough order of magnitude) cost
estimate for a missile having characteristics similar to
12
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Analysis Methodology

flows, allowing us to predict when yearly revenue
would recover cost, and when the net cumulative cash
flow became positive.

In our parametric analysis, the launch system
was characterized by the following parameters: gross
income per launch (either $lkg to orbit or $/launch),
spacecraft weight, launch rate, fIxed launch costs,
variable launch costs, initial launch vehicle cost, launch
vehicle learning curve rate, IRR, construction cost and
interest rate. Interest rate remained fIxed throughout
the period. Construction cost and payload weight were
determined by the launcher variant under evaluation.
Fixed and variable launch costs were based on the JVL
data as discussed previously.
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In order to ensure that we captured the true
range of launch costs, we conducted excursions with
increases of 50% in variable launch costs and fIxed
launch costs. We also performed excursions with a
50% decrease in these values. We carried out a similar
analysis on the construction costs: a 50% increase, a
50% and a 100% decrease. The cost decreases have also
served to provide data points to include the effect of
construction cost subsidies.
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Figure 10: Income Stream Graphs

We used IRR as a fIgure of merit as well as a
parameter. We gained useful information by holding
all parameters constant except for the cost of the fIrst
launch vehicle and the learning curve rate for the
production of launch vehicles. Analyses of this kind
allowed us to determine the range of launch vehicle
parameters that would allow rates of return comparable
with other competing projects of similar payoff and risk
under specifIed market assumptions (launch price and
launch rate). This information was then used to help
explore a fInancially feasible region for launch vehicle
parameters.

Cost Analysis

We will illustrate the results with a few of the
graphs and tables we developed in the course of the
analysis. All the graphs presented in this section will
be for the values indicated in the Table 5 unless
otherwise indicated.
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Figure 11: Launch Costs
We also examined the effect of varying the
launch rate. Our original concept was that the launcher
would probably be most cost effective in a "mass
market," with a launch rate in the vicinity of 300
launches per year. When we varied the launch rate and

The income stream graph shown in Figure 10
corresponds to an IRR of 20%. The fIrst year that the
operation turns a yearly profIt is in year 5. However,
cumulative cash flow is not positive until year 9.
Analyses of this type provided time data for income
13

Gilreath

12th AIAAlUSU Conference on Small Satellites

Table 7: Comparative LEO Payloads & Costs

looked at the required revenue stream expressed in
terms of dollars per launch rather than dollars per kg,
we found possible alternate operating points, as shown
by Figure 11. The lower trace on this graph shows those
combinations of total mission cost and launch rate
which result in a breakeven situation (NPV 0). The
upper trace shows those combinations that resulted in
an IRR of 30%. (This value was chosen as
representative of the minimum IRR needed to make the
launch system as attractive as alternate technology
investments.) Analysis of graphs such as these led us to
consider launch rates on the order of one launch per
week. Although the cost per kg in this regime is much
higher, the cost of approximately $2.5M per launch is
within the typical budget of small satellite researchers.

Pegasus
LLV-l
Conestog
Taurus
LLV-2
LLV-3
Delta 7925
AR40
Atlas II
AR44P
SL-4
Zenit-2
AR5
Proton D 1
Titan IV/SRM U

The study also allowed us to determine the
major cost drivers for the operation of the launch
system. We had reasonable estimates of most of the
costs involved in calculating the Total Ownership Cost
(TOC), with the exception of major maintenance and
disposal costs. We found that variations of 50%
increases or decreases in construction or operating costs
had little effect on the overall cost element distribution.
Table 6 illustrates two typical potential operating
points, and highlights a key result: reductions in launch
vehicle cost offer the greatest opportunity for driving
the launch costs down further.

800
889
1400
1990
3655
3990
4900
5510
6900
7000
13740
18000
20900
21640

$MlLaunch
$
$
$
$19
$21
$25
$48
$53
$80
$88
$1

$13,571
$10,553
$6,840
$11,905
$10,714
$14,519
$12,681

As we noted above, the estimated mission cost
for the gun launch system would be approximately
$2.5M to place a 113 kg satellite into LEO at a launch
rate of about one per week. This cost compares
favorably to that of the nearest current system
(Pegasus), even allowing for multiple satellites to be
carried on Pegasus. The most recent estimate puts the
Pegasus launch cost at $16M to place 250 kg into a 600
km sun-synchronous orbif6•

Table 6: Cost Element Breakdown

Yearly Launch Rate
Cost Area

300 Launches

Construction
Fixed Operating
Variable Operating
Launch Vehicle
Total

9%
1%
4%
86%
100%

To achieve a favorable specific cost ($ per kg),
the launch rate must be near the limitations of the
launch system, which is 300 launches per year. This
launch rate is probably sustainable from a mechanical
point of view, but we are unable to justify such launch
rates based on even the most optimistic market
projections and assumptions about market share. While
it is certainly possible that the existence of the
capability to perform nearly daily launches of small
satellites might be the enabling technology for a new
era of the exploitation of near earth space we cannot
quantify such a belief. There are also issues regarding
the limitations inherent in the fixed inclination of the
launching system that have not been addressed in this
analysis.

52 Launches

30%

!

100%

Comparison with Other Systems
We will conclude the fmancial discussion with
a brief comparison of the gun launch system to current
launch systems. All cost data for competitive systems
is taken from Isak.owitz25 • A selected portion of this
data is contained in Table 7. We should be careful to
point out that these comparisons are crude and indirect.
They do not account for differences in launch vehicle
scale, orbital parameters, or economic factors.

Conclusions and Observations
We conclude that placing small satellites into
orbit using a distributed-injection light gas gun is
technically feasible, provided that certain critical
developments are made. For the launcher, the key
components are fast acting, high flow rate valves and an
endurable high-temperature, high-pressure hydrogen
14
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heater. Thermal protection, aerodynamic stability, and
packaging efficiency represent significant problems for
the vehicle.

Developing a higher fidelity design of the launch
vehicle to better uncover potential challenges, and
increasing the fidelity of the system level cost estimates
are also part of our plans.

Because of the large power levels required for
high-throughput global telecommunications, our initial
design iteration indicated that spacecraft in the 100-kg
class cannot meet the requirements of the reference
mission, given the limits on payload mass and volume.
In broadening the mission set, however, we found that a
large range of useful, less power-intensive payloads and
missions were possible. The actual range of possible
payload weight and power are dependent on the level of
technology incorporated in the spacecraft structure and
batteries, as well as the level of the requirement for onorbit propulsion.
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Our economic analysis showed that a payloadto-orbit cost of approximately $5500 per kg would be
required to yield an internal rate of return (IRR) of
30%, if the launch rate could be pushed to 300 per year.
At the same specific launch cost, the operation would
break-even with 150 launches per year. While this cost
is comparable to present rates, the cost of conventional
launches is likely to come down in the future as new
and upgraded launch vehicles enter the competition. As
a result, we have some concern about the market
attractiveness of the light-gas gun launcher for
applications in which specific launch cost is important.
Complexities are likely to arise when designing a
system for a gun environment, and even 150 launches
per year goes beyond current projections for small
satellites.
On the other hand, when approached from the
perspective of total mission cost, the gun launch system
looks very interesting. With a launch rate as low as
one per week, a total mission cost of approximately
$2.5M would yield an internal rate of return of 30% and
a total mission cost as low as $1.5M would permit
break-even operation.
These mission costs are
considerably less than current systems and provide for
some interesting possibilities for small satellite
operations. The fundamental question relates to market
elasticity. If a launch system were available that
provided such a low cost per mission, would we see a
dramatic increase in the demand for launches? (If we
build it, will they come?)
It appears to us that further analysis of the
viability of a light gas gun for affordable access to
space is warranted. Our future work is likely to focus
on total system optimization based on overall cost and
utility, and on the evaluation of more advanced
missions enabled by affordable on-demand access to
space; e.g.; on-orbit satellite refurbishment or upgrade.
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speed aerodynamics and propulsion. His experience includes the application of computational tools to the design
and analysis of high-speed vehicles and the experimental assessment of hypersonic air-breathing propulsion
systems. In addition, he has considerable experience in program and line management gained through his roles as
Program Manager for the National Aerospace Plane (NASP) program and Assistant Supervisor of the Propulsion
Group, respectively. Mr. White was appointed to the Principal Professional Staff in 1991 and is currently the
Program Area Manager for Advanced Vehicle Technologies in the Milton S. Eisenhower Research and Technology
Development Center.

HARRY E. CARTLAND attended Cornell University on an ROTC scholarship, graduating with a AB in chemistry
in 1980. Electing to defer active service, he emolled in the graduate program at the UC Berkeley College of
Chemistry. After receiving his Ph.D. in physical chemistry in 1985, he spent seven years on active duty in the US
Army where he served in a number of assignments, including as a member of the faculty at the United States
Military Academy and as a research officer at the Ballistic Research Laboratory. Harry left the Army in 1992 and
spent six months as a visiting scholar at Duke University before assuming his present position. He is currently
physicist and special project leader in the Engineering Department at LLNL.
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Harry has been fortunate to work in a number of areas. They have included spectroscopy and photochemistry in
cryogenic solids, modeling of large aperture excimer lasers, gas phase atom-molecule reaction dynamics, and
computational (quantum) chemistry. He is now the project leader for the §uper !!igh ~ltitude g,esearch ~roject.
Originally a technology demonstrator for gun launch into space, SHARP has doubled as a free-flight aerophysics
test facility for hypersonic air-breathing (scramjet) propulsion.

JOHN W. HUNTER received his undergraduate degree from University of California - San Diego and a Ph.D. in
plasma physics from William and Mary. From there he joined the staff of LLNL, and started the Super High
Altitude Research Project (SHARP). SHARP was designed as a technology demonstrator for gun launch to space
and, at the time, was the world's largest light gas launcher. John currently runs JH&A, a private consulting business
based in San Diego.

19

Gilreath

lilt AIAAlUSU Conference on Small Satellites

